DMARC Record Checker

Find a domain's DMARC policy, check its syntax and see in plain language what receivers will do with failing mail.

Result

Worth a look

Checked

  • Consider

    Policy: none (monitoring only)

    Receivers report on failures but deliver spoofed mail normally. Use p=none while you review reports, then move to quarantine and reject.

  • OK

    Reports to google.com are authorised

    gmail.com._report._dmarc.google.com publishes v=DMARC1, so receivers will send reports there.

Record at _dmarc.gmail.com

v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=quarantine; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com
Policy (p)none (monitor only)
Subdomain policy (sp)quarantine (send to spam/junk)
Non-existent subdomains (np)quarantine (send to spam/junk) (default: same as sp)
DKIM alignment (adkim)relaxed — same organisational domain is enough
SPF alignment (aspf)relaxed — same organisational domain is enough
Percentage (pct)100% (default)
Aggregate reports (rua)mailauth-reports@google.com
Failure reports (ruf)none
Failure options (fo)0

Related records

About this tool

DMARC (RFC 9989, the current standard, which replaced RFC 7489) tells receiving mail servers what to do when a message claims to be from your domain but fails authentication, and where to send reports about it. It is a TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain.

A message passes DMARC when SPF or DKIM passes and the domain that passed matches (aligns with) the domain in the visible From address.

How to read the results

p — policy
none: only report. quarantine: treat failing mail as suspicious (spam folder). reject: refuse it.
sp — subdomain policy
Applies to subdomains without their own record. Defaults to p.
np — non-existent subdomain policy
New in RFC 9989: applies to subdomains that do not exist in DNS. Defaults to sp.
adkim / aspf — alignment
r (relaxed, default): the authenticated domain may be a subdomain of the From domain (same organisational domain). s (strict): must match exactly.
rua — aggregate reports
Where daily XML summaries are sent. Reports to another domain need an authorisation record at that domain.
ruf — failure reports
Per-message reports; few providers send them.
pct — percentage
Share of failing mail the policy applies to. Removed in RFC 9989 but still seen; newer receivers may ignore it.
fo — failure reporting options
When to send failure reports: 0 (all fail, default), 1 (any fails), d (DKIM fails), s (SPF fails).

Limitations

  • If a domain has no record, parent domains are checked the way receivers discover an organisational policy (tree walk). The top-level domain itself is not queried.
  • This tool reads the published policy. It cannot see whether your real mail passes — that is what the rua reports are for. To test one message, use the e-mail header analyzer.
  • DKIM cannot be verified from a domain name alone, because keys are published under selectors that are not discoverable. Enter a selector in the DKIM lookup to check a key.

Frequently asked questions

What DMARC policy should I start with?

Start with p=none and an rua address, review the reports for a few weeks, fix any legitimate senders that fail, then move to quarantine and finally reject.

Do I need both SPF and DKIM?

DMARC needs only one of them to pass with alignment, but set up both: SPF fails on forwarding, and DKIM can break when mailing lists modify messages. Having both makes delivery more robust.

Why are my reports going to a third party not arriving?

The receiving domain must publish yourdomain._report._dmarc.theirdomain TXT "v=DMARC1". This checker tests that automatically for every external rua/ruf address.

Is DMARC required?

Google and Yahoo require a DMARC record (at least p=none) for bulk senders since 2024, and many security frameworks expect p=quarantine or reject.

Where is the DMARC record?

A TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain.

What is the best DMARC policy?

p=reject, reached step by step after monitoring with p=none.

What does rua mean?

The address that receives daily aggregate reports.

Does DMARC stop all phishing?

It stops exact-domain spoofing, not look-alike domains.